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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Roy Johnson appeals from the district court’s order awarding $101,664.65 restitution to
his injured victim, Clarence Knight. The State had made no request for restitution in this case,
and the 180-day period granted by the court had expired, when the victim, through his personal
injury attorney, and independently from the prosecutor’s officer, filed a motion asking for
restitution in an amount equal to the victim’s medical bills – $101,664.65.
However, because the victim was incarcerated, he had actually paid none of these bills,
even though he had previously received $100,000 settlement payment from Mr. Johnson’s
liability insurer, and had expressly released Mr. Johnson from all further claims and future
demands for those same losses.
Notwithstanding the victim’s lack of standing or the untimeliness of the restitution
motion filed by his attorney, the district court granted the victim’s motion and ordered
Mr. Johnson to pay him restitution in full amount of his medical bills, without an offset for the
$100,000 settlement payment, and without regard for settlement agreement and release.
On appeal, Mr. Johnson asserts the district court erred when it ordered restitution, and its
restitution order should be vacated.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In April of 2017, Mr. Johnson was driving under the influence and struck a pedestrian,
Clarence Knight, who was standing in the roadway at around 11:00 at night. (PSI, pp.11-12.)
Mr. Knight was taken to the hospital for his injuries. (R., p.137.) Pursuant to a plea agreement,

1

Mr. Johnson pled guilty to aggravated DUI1 and was sentenced to ten years, with three years
fixed.

(R., pp.24-39, 49.)

The State did not present a restitution request at the time of

sentencing; the prosecutor stated she was looking into insurance and needed to calculate the outof-pocket loss; she also indicated that Mr. Knight was still receiving medical treatment. (PSI,
p.12; Tr., p.5, Ls.11-18.) Defense counsel stated that Mr. Johnson had insurance. (Tr., p.8, L.24
– p.9, L.2.) At the State’s request, the district court ordered that restitution remain open for a
period of 180 days. (Tr., p.12, Ls.21-22.) No restitution request was filed within this period,
which expired on January 10, 2018, nor did the State at any point make any request to extend the
time. (See generally R.)
On March 14, 2018, two months after the restitution period had expired, Mr. Knight’s
personal injury attorney, Jeffery McKinnie, McKinnie Law Offices, filed a motion for an order
of restitution in Mr. Johnson’s criminal case. (R., pp.62-68.) The motion was accompanied by
copies of Mr. Knight’s medical records and medical billing statements, along with the affidavit
of Mr. Knight stating that, as a result of the traumatic brain injury he suffered, he did not recall
whether he was notified or contacted by the Canyon County prosecutor regarding the issue of
restitution. (R., p.78.) In addition to filing the restitution motion, Mr. Knight’s counsel noticed
that motion for hearing and filed motions for orders to transport Mr. Johnson and Knight 2 to that
hearing. (R., pp.89, 91.)

1

The Plea Advisory Form specifies there was no agreement regarding payment of restitution.
(R., p.24.)
2
It was necessary to transport the victim, Mr. Knight, from prison because on October 10, 2017,
(two months before the restitution period expired), Knight himself had been arrested for felony
DUI, and had remained in State custody since that date. (See R., p.79; Tr., p.23, L.25 – p.24,
L.2; PSI, p.12.)
2

On March 20, 2018 – after filing the motion for restitution, but before the restitution
hearing – Mr. Knight signed a Release of Claims acknowledging a settlement payment of
$100,000 and discharging Mr. Johnson from all liability for claims regarding medical expenses
and all other losses, and agreeing to hold harmless and indemnify Mr. Johnson from all medical
liens or “demands of any kind which have been made, or may be asserted against him” resulting
from the claim. (R., p.127.)
The district court granted Mr. Knight’s motion to transport, and Mr. Knight’s motion for
restitution eventually came on for hearing. (R., pp.107, 109, 111; Tr., p.16, L.1 – p.28, L.13.)
At that hearing, Mr. Knight’s attorney requested restitution in an amount representing his unpaid
medical bills, later calculated as totaling $101,664.65. (R., pp.77-83; 140; PSI, pp.1-9.)
Mr. Johnson objected to the restitution request on multiple grounds. He objected that the
request was untimely, noting that the already-extended restitution period ordered by the court
had expired two months prior to the restitution request having been made. (Tr., p.18, Ls.12-16.)
Mr. Johnson also objected on the ground that Mr. Knight and his personal attorney did
not have standing to file a restitution request independent of State and Canyon County
Prosecutor’s Office. (Tr., p.16, Ls.13-22.) He argued that Mr. Knight, even if a victim under the
statute, was not a party to the criminal case and had no standing, independent of the State, to file
motions. (Tr., p.16, Ls.13-22.) Mr. Johnson likewise argued that Mr. Knight’s private attorney
was not permitted to file motions in the criminal case, since only the public prosecutor had the
authority to represent the State. (Tr., p.16, L.23 – p. 17, L.8.) Mr. Johnson asserted that the
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proper avenue for the victim to ask for restitution was through the Canyon County Prosecuting
Attorney’s Office.3 (Tr., p.16, L.23 – p. 17, L.8.)
The State prosecutor was also present at the hearing, but she did not otherwise participate
in the restitution proceedings other than to represent the State’s position that, on the standing
issue, Mr. Johnson had made a “valid point,” i.e., that the victim and his private counsel did not
have standing to petition for restitution independently of the State. (See generally R.; Tr., p.16,
L.1 – p.28, L.13.)
The district court overruled Mr. Johnson’s timeliness and standing objections and
allowed Mr. Knight’s counsel to proceed. (Tr., p.17, L.17 – p.18, L.11.)
Addressing the merits of the restitution motion, Mr. Johnson argued that the amount of
any order must take into account the $100,000 already paid to Mr. Knight in settlement of
Knight’s claim against him. (R., pp.122-25.) In response, Mr. Knight’s attorney argued that the
insurance payment was “irrelevant”; he also revealed that Mr. Knight had in fact paid none of his
medical bills, notwithstanding the $100,000 settlement payment (Tr., p.26, Ls.12-15, p.21, L.20
– p.23, L.25); that due to his incarceration,4 all of the medical bills had gone into collection, and
none of his medical care providers had filed liens. (Tr., p.23, L.25 – p.24, L.7, p.26, Ls.12-15.)
Mr. Knight also told the district court that, in his view, even if his medical providers filed liens,
he would not use the settlement proceeds to pay them; according to Mr. Knight, and
notwithstanding the express terms of his settlement agreement, he considered those proceeds as
compensation only for his pain and suffering, and his undocumented economic losses. (Tr., p.23,

3

The record does not indicate whether Mr. Knight’s had approached the prosecutor’s office, or
whether the prosecutor, in the exercise of its discretion on whatever information it possessed, had
declined to request restitution for Mr. Knight.
4
According to the IDOC’s website, Mr. Knight will remain incarcerated until October 20, 2022,
at least. See https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/prisons/offender_search/detail/69157.
4

L.25 – p.24, L.7.) In short, counsel represented that Mr. Knight had not paid, and did not intend
to pay, any of his medical bills, even though he had received a $100,000 settlement for his
medical expenses.
At the request of the district court, additional briefing was filed by Mr. Johnson’s counsel
and by the victim’s counsel addressing the following questions: whether the $100,000 payment
could be considered for any purpose; whether the court could consider the fact that Knight had
not used that $100,000 to pay his medical bills; and whether the medical bills were
objectionable, and why. (Tr., p.26, L.22 – p.27, L.4.)
The district court requested no argument or additional briefing from the State, and the
State provided none. (See generally R., Tr., p.16, L.1 – p.28, L.13.)
After the briefing was completed, the district court issued a Restitution Order awarding
Mr. Knight $101,665.64 – an amount equal to the totals of his unpaid medical bills. (R., p.142.)
The district court found this was Mr. Knight’s “demonstrated economic loss” and that the civil
settlement, release, and payment of the $100,000 did not limit the court’s ability to award
restitution to Mr. Knight in that full amount. (R., p.142.)
Mr. Johnson timely appealed from that order. (R. p.145.)

5

ISSUE
Did the district court err by ordering Mr. Johnson to pay $101,665.64 restitution to Clarence
Knight?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Ordering Mr. Johnson To Pay $101,664.65 Restitution To Clarence
Knight

A.

Introduction
Idaho’s victim compensation statute, I.C. § 19-5304, grants the district court discretion to

order a defendant to pay restitution to victims for the economic loss “actually suffered” by the
victim as result of the defendant’s crime. The statute sets forth the legal requirements and
limitations pertaining to a victim’s right to obtain restitution, and sets the standards for the
court’s exercise of its authority. On appeal, Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court exceeded
its jurisdictional or statutory authority, or otherwise failed to comply with applicable legal
standards, in five different ways.
In section B of this brief, he argues that that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
entertain or grant the victim’s motion because neither the victim nor his personal attorney had
standing to file the motion. In section C, he argues that the district court exceeded its authority
by granting an untimely restitution request filed after the restitution period expired.
In Section D of this brief, Mr. Johnson asserts that, even if the district court had authority
to grant an order of restitution, the court erred because: (1) there was no evidence of “out-ofpocket” expenses paid by the victim, and therefore no showing of economic loss “actually
suffered” by the victim, as required by the restitution statute; (2) the district court improperly
refused to offset the restitution amount by the $100,000 payment already made to the victim in
settlement of this claim; and (3) the district court refused to give effect to the parties’ settlement
agreement, payment and release results in a improper windfall to the victim. The district court’s
restitution order should be vacated.

7

B.

District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Entertain And Grant The Motion Filed By The
Victim Because The Victim And His Private Counsel Lacked Standing To File The
Motion
The district court’s order of restitution should be vacated because the district court lacked

jurisdiction to consider and grant the motion requesting that relief, since neither the victim nor
his private lawyer had standing to file motions in Mr. Johnson’s criminal case.
In this case, the motion for restitution was filed by Mr. Knight’s personal injury attorney,
Jeffery McKinnie, McKinnie Law Offices, independently from the State and the Canyon County
Prosecutor’s Office. (R., pp.62, 136.) Mr. Johnson objected to the motion on that basis, arguing
that Mr. Knight, though a victim, lacked standing independent of the State, that private counsel
was not authorized to act on behalf of the State in this case, and that a request for victim
restitution may only be filed by the public prosecutor. (Tr., p.16, Ls.13-22.)
The State conceded that Mr. Johnson “makes a valid point” “as far as the victim being
able to file or petition the Court for their own restitution order separate and apart from anything
done through the prosecutor’s office.” (Tr., p.17, Ls.10-16.) Mr. Knight’s counsel, on the other
hand, insisted the language of the restitution statute, I.C. § 19-5304(6), “guts their argument.”
(Tr., p.17, L.19 – p.18, L.8.) Based on its reading of the statute, the district court agreed with the
Mr. Knight and overruled the standing objection. (Tr., p.18, Ls.9-11.) Later, in its written
decision, the district court decided, alternatively, that the “standing argument does not preclude
an order of restitution.” (R., p.158.) As explained below, the district court lacked jurisdiction or
other authority to entertain or grant the victim’s motion filed independently of the State.
1.

Standards Of Review

Whether a party has standing is a jurisdictional issue. In re Doe I, 164 Idaho 393, 395
(2018). A question of jurisdiction is fundamental, it cannot be ignored when brought to [the
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court’s] attention and should be address prior to considering the merits of the appeal.” State v.
Kavajecz, 139 842, 843 (2003). Issues of the district court’s jurisdiction are issues of law subject
to free review on appeal. State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227 (2014).
The district court’s interpretation and application of statutes is subject to free review.
State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory
construction. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389
(Ct. App. 2000).
2.

Victims Are Not Parties And Lack Standing To File Motions In A Criminal Case

The rights granted to victims by Idaho’s constitution and statutes do not alter the
fundamental rule that it is the State, and the State alone, through the prosecuting attorney, that
prosecutes criminal cases and petitions the court for orders against the defendants that it
prosecutes. See I.C. § 19-104; I.C. § 31-2604(1). Among the rights granted to victims by the
Legislature, participating as a “party” in a criminal case was not one of them. See Idaho Const.
art. I, § 22; I.C. §§ 19-5304; 19-5306; 19-2515.
As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court, the Idaho Constitution guarantees victims the
rights created by statute, which provide that victims are entitled “[t]o restitution, as provided by
law, from the person committing the offense that caused the victim’s loss.” Idaho Const. art. I, §
22 (emphasis added); State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 887 (2013). Section 19-5304 provides the
“law” by which the court orders restitution to crime victims, and “the court’s power to
order restitution is limited to that provided by the statute.” Straub, at 887.
Subsection 19-5304(6) of the restitution statute – the language relied upon by the district
court - provides in relevant part:

9

Economic loss shall be based upon the preponderance of evidence submitted to
the court by the prosecutor, defendant, victim or presentence investigator.
Each party shall have the right to present such evidence as may be relevant to
the issue of restitution, and the court may consider such hearsay as may be
contained in the presentence report, victim impact statement or otherwise
provided to the court.
Id. (emphasis added.)
The plain language of the statute5 expressly grants a “party” the “right to present”
relevant evidence, and the parties in a criminal case are the State and the defendant. The victim
is not a party, and no right to present is granted by the statute. Id. The statute also limits the
evidence on which the court may base its finding of economic loss, to evidence submitted “by
the prosecutor, defendant, victim or presentence investigator,” and expressly allows for hearsay.
Id. However, this evidentiary burden does not create petitioner or plaintiff standing for the
victim.
In this case, the victim’s attorney filed the motion for restitution, noticed it for hearing,
requested orders to transport the defendant, filed briefing and argued at the restitution hearing –
all independent of any action by the State or the prosecuting attorney. These independent actions
were improper to invoke the authority of the district court, because only the State and the
defendant have standing as parties to file motions in a criminal case and present arguments to the
district court. See Idaho Criminal Rule 47. The restitution statute does not grant that right to
victims.

Additionally, although the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide procedural

5

The district court’s interpretation and application of statutes is subject to free review. State v.
Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the language of a statute
is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging
in statutory construction. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219
(1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000).
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mechanisms by which a non-party may seek to intervene or be joined as a plaintiff in a civil case,
see I.R.C.P. 13(h), 19, 20(a), no similar mechanism exists in the Idaho Criminal Rules.
3.

The State Has The Duty To Request And Obtain Restitution Orders For Victims

Moreover, there is no Idaho case law permitting a victim, independent from the State, to
appear and bring motions in the defendant’s criminal case. On the contrary, in Idaho, requests
for restitution orders are made in the criminal case, exclusively by the State and its prosecuting
attorney. Idaho’s appellate cases universally place the burden on the State to prove economic
loss actually suffered by a given victim, in accordance with the statute. See, e.g., State v. Straub,
153 Idaho 882, 885 (2013). The appellate courts likewise place the burden on the State to timely
present victim restitution requests, and to demonstrate the necessity of any delay. See State v.
Jensen, 149 Idaho 758, 762 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Weeks, 160 Idaho 195, 198 (Ct. App. 2016).
In this case, Mr. Knight’s filing was more than a request to present evidence; he moved
for an order that Mr. Johnson pay him more than $100,000, he noticed his motion for hearing, he
filed motions asking the court to order the Department of Correction to transport inmates, and his
counsel argued at the restitution hearing. (R., pp.89, 91, 106.)

4.

Private Counsel Representing An Interested Party May Not Act As Special
Prosecutor In A Criminal Proceeding

Idaho courts have consistently recognized the role of the prosecuting attorney, as
representative of the State, to request and obtain restitution orders from court, in accordance with
the requirements of the statute. See State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885 (2013), State v. Jensen,
149 Idaho 758, 762 (Ct. App. 2010).

See also I.C. § 31-2604(1) (placing the duty on the

prosecutor to prosecute all motions, civil or criminal, where the State is a party.) The role of the
prosecutor is distinct from that of other attorneys, in that “the prosecutor has the responsibility of
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a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.” Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct
(“I.R.C.P.”), Rule 3.8 cmt.1; ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 3.8, cmt.1
(identical). Additionally, the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function
(“ABA Standards”),6 state that “The prosecutor generally serves the public and not any particular
government agency, law enforcement officer or unit, witness or victim.” ABA Standard 3-1.3.
These standards provide that “[a] private attorney who is paid by, or who has an attorney-client
relationship with, an individual or entity that is a victim of the charged crime … should not be
permitted to serve as prosecutor in that matter.” ABA Standard 3-2.1(c).
In this case, however, the district court effectively bestowed upon private counsel the role
of the public prosecutor. While the law does make provision for the appointment of special
prosecutors, see I.C. § 31-2603, no such appointment was purportedly made in this case, an
attorney representing the victim in the related civil case is not qualified to serve in that role. See
Young v. Vuitton et Fils SA., 481 U.S. 787 (1987). In Young, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
held that the appointment of an interested party’s counsel to prosecute a criminal contempt of
judicial order, entered in a civil case, was invalid and required reversal of the contempt
conviction. Id. In the present case, not only was private counsel representing an interested
client, the record indicates that counsel, himself, held a financial interest in the restitution
amount requested, given his statement that his legal fee was paid as a percentage of the recovery.
(R., p.133 n.1.) The appointment of an interested prosecutor has long been viewed as a violation
of the defendant’s due process rights. See Young, 481 U.S. at 808 n.19. Thus, the de facto
appointment of the victim’s personal lawyer as prosecutor was inconsistent with the applicable

6

ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function (4th Edition)
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthEditi
on/ (last visited May 27, 2019).
12

statutes, ethical rules, and the defendant’s due process rights, and the district court exceeded its
authority when it considered and granted the restitution motion by such counsel.
The district court erred in concluding that it had authority to grant Mr. Knight’s motion,
notwithstanding the filing parties’ lack of standing to file a motion in this case. The district court
lacked jurisdiction, or any other authority, to grant the motion, and the order, therefore, should be
vacated.
C.

The District Court Exceeded Its Authority By Granting A Restitution Request Filed After
The Statutory Time Had Expired
Idaho Code § 19-5304(6) provides that, “[r]estitution orders shall be entered by the court

at the time of sentencing or such later date as deemed necessary by the court.” (Emphasis
added.) The Court of Appeals has stated that, “this section contemplates that the court may need
to grant the prosecution a reasonable amount of time necessary to gather information so as to
locate all victims and correctly compute the amount of restitution.” State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho
758, 762 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659, 662 (Ct. App. 2002)
(emphasis original to Ferguson and Jensen); accord State v. Keys, 160 Idaho 195, 198
(Ct. App. 2016). While not jurisdictional, this statutory limitation “set[s] the standards for the
court’s exercise of its authority.” Jensen, 149 Idaho at 762. An order of restitution that does not
comply with the statute’s time limitation represents and abuse of the district court’s discretion,
and is invalid, requiring that the order be vacated. Id.
In Ferguson, the Court of Appeals vacated a trial court’s award of restitution, entered
after the criminal case had closed, holding that because (1) the trial court lacked authority to
reopen the criminal case, after it lost authority over the defendant, in order to enter an order of
restitution; and because (2) the State failed to show it was “necessary” to put off the entry of the
order of restitution for as long as it did. Id. at 662. In Jensen, the Court of Appeals vacated the
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restitution order entered six years after sentencing, where the State acknowledged that the delay
was not because of time it needed to process the request, but because the case “fell through the
cracks.” Id. at 763. More importantly, in State v. Keys, the Court of Appeals stated that,
regardless of the length of the delay, the time limitations provided by the I.C. § 19-5306(6)
require a showing by the State that the delay was reasonably necessary. 160 Idaho 195, 198
(Ct. App. 2016).
In the present case, the presentence investigator reported that Mr. Knight had been taken
to St. Alphonsus Hospital, that he had undergone jaw surgery later and was still receiving
medical treatment, and the State did not anticipate a final cost by the time of sentencing. (PSI,
pp.12, 13, 71.) At the sentencing hearing on July 14, 2017, the State asked for an additional
180-days to submit restitution; the district court granted that request (Tr., p.5, Ls.11-18; p.12,
Ls.21-22.) That period expired on January 10, 2018, without the State submitting a restitution
request.

(See generally R.)

Mr. Knight filed his restitution request two months later, on

March 14th. (R., pp.62-68.)
Although the prosecuting attorney was present at the restitution hearing, she offered no
reason why the State never requested restitution for Mr. Knight; she did not indicate whether the
State had considered making a request, but in the exercise of its discretion, chose not to, or
whether there was some inadvertence on the part of the State, or any other reason.

(See

generally R.; Tr., p.16, L.1 – p.28, L.13.) In either case, the record is clear that the prosecutor
never represented to the district court that an extension beyond the 180-period previously
ordered was either warranted or reasonably necessary. (See Tr., p.16, L.1 – p.28, L.13.)
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However, in overruling Mr. Johnson’s timeliness objection, the district court found the
motion to be timely because it was just nine months after sentencing (Tr., p.18, Ls.17-21), then
later, in its order, made an additional finding, that
The late filing was reasonably necessary in light of Knight’s significant medical
injuries, including a traumatic brain injury, which may have impaired his ability
to timely or effectively work with the prosecution on restitution matters.
(R., p.143.)
Mr. Johnson asserts, that neither this finding, nor the state of record in this case, are
adequate to satisfy the State’s burden of demonstrating that the additional delay was “reasonably
necessary.”
The record shows that the two months before the restitution period expired, in October of
2017, Mr. Knight himself was arrested and charged by the Canyon County Prosecutor’s Office
with felony DUI 7 and that he continued to remain in the custody of the State. (See R., p.79;
Tr., p.23, L.25 – p.24, L.2.) Thus, even if the prosecutor’s office lost contact with Mr. Knight at
some point,8 this record shows that the Canyon County Prosecutor’s Office had located him by
October of 2017, which was well within the court-ordered restitution period, which expired
January 14, 2018. Yet, notwithstanding the obvious location of, and contacts with, Mr. Knight,
the State filed no request seeking restitution for Mr. Knight – either within the 180-day period or

7

See State v. Clarence Knight, Canyon County Case No. CR-14-17-17371. According to the
IDOC Offender Search website, Mr. Knight will remain imprisoned until at least October of
2022. See https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/prisons/offender_search/detail/69157 (last visited
5/22/19.)
8
Mr. Knight’s affidavit states he was homeless for a period after he left the hospital and prior to
his arrest. (R., p.98.) The State’s victim witness coordinator appears to have had a working
number for Mr. Knight, but the voice mailbox had not been set up when the presentence
investigator attempted to reach him. (See PSI, p.12)
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any time afterwards. (See generally R.) Whether intentional or inadvertent, the State’s failure to
seek restitution within the court-ordered time cannot be justified as necessary.
More importantly, the record contains no evidence that Mr. Knight’s had ever sought to
work with the prosecution regarding restitution, even after he discovered Mr. Johnson’s DUI and
hired a personal attorney to represent him. (See generally R.; Tr., p.16, L.1 – p.28, L.13.) Thus,
the district court’s finding that Mr. Knight’s injuries “may have impaired his ability to timely and
effectively work with the prosecution” is not tied to its ruling that those injuries rendered the
delay in filing the request “necessary.” (See R., p.143.)
In summary, the restitution request was untimely under the statute, because the State
offered no evidence or argument that the delay was “reasonably necessary,” and the record does
otherwise support such a finding by the district court. Therefore, the district court exceeded its
authority when it ordered restitution in contravention of time limitation in I.C. § 19-5304(6), and
the restitution order should be vacated. See Jensen, at 764.
D.

The District Court Erred In Determining The Amount Of The Restitution To Order
Even if the district court had jurisdiction or authority to entertain an untimely motion for

restitution filed by a no-party, the $101,664.64 award is erroneous, for three reasons. First, even
if Mr. Knight was entitled to restitution from Mr. Johnson, the district court erred by failing to
credit the $100,000 settlement payment already made to Knight. Second, the district court erred
by failing to give effect to the terms of the Release signed by Mr. Knight. Third, the undisputed
evidence shows there was no economic loss actually suffered by Mr. Knight.
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1.

The District Court Erred When It Refused To Offset Mr. Johnson’s Restitution
Obligation By The $100,000 Settlement Payment Already Made To Mr. Knight

In this case, Mr. Knight had already received $100,000 payment to settle all of his claims
against Mr. Johnson, including those for medical expenses. (R., pp.129, 137.) The district court
acknowledged this payment, but refused to credit or offset the amount of restitution that it
ordered Mr. Johnson to pay to Knight. (R., pp.137, 142.) Instead, the district court stated that
“the settlement, Release, and prior insurance payments do not limit the Court’s ability to award
restitution equal to the full amount of Knight’s economic loss.” (R., p.142.) The district court
also failed to explain why Mr. Knight’s “economic loss” (if any) was not compensated in whole
or in part by the $100,000 payment he had already received, and made no finding that it had
allocated any amount to any of Mr. Knight’s purported9 non-economic damages.

(See

R., pp.136-43). The district court’s conclusion that the payment does not limit the award is
contrary to Idaho Court of Appeals precedent, and contrary to language of the restitution statute.
a.

The District Court Misapplied Idaho Court Of Appeals’ Precedent, Which
Actually Requires That Restitution Be Offset By Settlement Payments

The district court cited State v. Hamilton, for the proposition that, “a civil settlement of
the victim’s claim against a defendant does not bar a restitution order for the same loss.” 129
Idaho 938, 943 (Ct. App. 1997). (R., p.139.) The district court quoted the Court’s “reason
behind the rule,” which in turn was a quote taken from an Arizona case, State v. Iniguez, 821
P.2d 194, 197 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991):
Because restitution also promotes the rehabilitative purpose of the criminal law,
and because civil damage payments may not be fully compensatory, the court is
9

Nor would the record support any amount of such loss, since Mr. Knight offered no evidence
on the extent of his pain and suffering or other intangible loss. Moreover, any such allocation
would effectively be an award of intangible loss, which is expressly precluded by the statute.
See I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a).
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not automatically foreclosed from ordering some restitution simply because the
victim has received some compensation as a result of a civil action.
(R. p.139.)
However, while both Hamilton and Iniguez hold that a civil settlement and release do not
bar a subsequent criminal restitution order, both cases held that the restitution amount ordered
must be offset by the civil settlement payment. See Hamilton, at 943 (reducing amount of
restitution by amount of civil settlement between same parties), and Iniguez, at 197 (vacating and
restitution order and remanding for a determination of amount to be offset by civil settlement
between same parties). In explaining this rule and the reasoning behind it, the Court in Iniguez
stated:
In short, although the court must consider all economic losses of the victim under
[Arizona’s restitution statute] and must require the offender to make restitution in
the full amount of economic loss under [that statute], it should not order
restitution exceeding the victim's actual economic losses after crediting payments
received by the victim outside the criminal proceeding. See State v.
Ferguson, 165 Ariz. 275, 798 P.2d 413 (App.1990) (trial court erred by failing to
reduce restitution amount by value of stolen property returned to owners).
Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
Moreover, this principal that the amount awarded to the victim in a criminal restitution
order must be offset by the payment received in civil settlement between the parties appears to be
the universal rule, as it furthers the purpose of restitution which is to fully compensate crime
victims for losses actually suffered, spares victims the trouble of bringing a civil lawsuit for
recovery of the same loss, and avoids an unjustified double recovery from defendants. See, e.g.,
People v. Bernal, 123 Cal.Rptr.2nd 622, 623-24 (Cal. App. 2002) (remanding for trial court to
determine restitution obligation, and holding “A defendant is entitled to an offset for amounts
paid to the victim by the defendant’s own insurer”); see also United States v. Maskek, 588
F.3d 1283 (10th Cir. 2009) (criminal court considers total loss in calculating sentence, but
regarding restitution, “the court must reduce restitution by any amount the victim received as
part of a civil settlement”); People v. Tzitzikalakis, 864 .E. 2d 44 (N.Y. 2007) (restitution order
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must be offset by amount of civil settlement); Kirby v. State, 863 So.2d 238, 244-45 (Fla. 2003)
(on remand, “the amount of the settlement will be a relevant factor for the trial court to consider
in determining the amount of restitution so as to prevent a double recovery” from the defendant);
Abeyta v. State, 42 P.3d 1009 (Wyo. 2002) (agreements between parties have no effect on court’s
order of restitution except to the extent that the statute requires offset).
Thus, contrary to the district court’s reasoning and holding, the precedent of the Idaho
Court of Appeals required that the amount of restitution ordered be offset by the settlement
payment. The district court failed to comply with this legal requirement when it disregarded the
settlement payment, representing an abuse of discretion.
b.

The District Court’s Disregard Of The $100,000 Payment From Grants An
Unjustified Windfall To Mr. Knight

The district court also reasoned that crediting an insurance payment would grant an
unwarranted windfall to the defendant. (See R., p.142.) However, the cases relied upon by the
district court, State v. Fortin, 124 Idaho 323 (Ct. App.1993), State v. Gardiner, 127 Idaho 156
(Ct. App. 1995); and State v. Cheeney, 144 Idaho 294 (Ct. App. 2007), deal with a very different
context and have no application to the circumstances presented in this case.
In these three cases, the Court was concerned with a fortuitous “windfall” to the
defendant, and involved payment to a victim from sources other than the defendant, and the
question of whether those payments should reduce the defendant’s restitution obligation. See
Fortin, at 326 (victim’s own insurance covered loss), Gardiner at 167 (victim’s medical
insurance covered loss), and Cheeney at 297 (victim’s bank repaid loss). In each of those cases,
the Court of Appeals was concerned the defendant would “gain a windfall in the event that a
victim had the foresight to obtain insurance or the diligence to pursue some other form of
compensation for his or her loss.” Cheeney, 144 Idaho at 297 (citing Gardiner).
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By contrast, in this case the defendant’s own insurance made payment for a liability that
the defendant had insured. Thus, there is not the “windfall” to the defendant concerned the Court
in Fortin, Gardiner, and Cheeney. See also People v. Bernal, 123 Cal.Rptr.2nd 622, 629-32
(Cal. App. 2002) (explaining that payments made by defendant’s liability insurer – as opposed to
payments by other third party sources – do not constitute a “windfall” and must offset
defendant’s restitution obligation.)
On the contrary, Mr. Knight had secured $100,000 from Mr. Johnson’s insurer to settle
his medical expense claims, on the promise that he would release him from that such claim, and
hold him harmless against any future claims and “demands of any kind.”

By granting

Mr. Knight’s request for an order that Mr. Johnson for these same expense, again, the district
court gave Mr. Knight unjustified double recovery. The purpose of the restitution statute is to
compensate victims for actually-suffered economic loss, without the need of a civil action. See
State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 387098 (Ct. App. 2012). But here, that purpose has been
corrupted to allow prohibited double-dipping. Accord Moon v. Brewer, 89 Idaho 59, 62-63
(1965) (discussing doctrine against double recovery). Idaho’s courts should not be party to or
endorse this unsavory a practice.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should modify the restitution order by reducing the
amount by the $100,000 settlement payment, as was done by the Court of Appeals in State v.
Hamilton, 129 Idaho at 943, or else vacate the order and remand the case to the district court for
a redetermination of the amount to order.
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c.

The District Court’s Failure To Offset The Restitution Amount By The
Insurance Payment Is Inconsistent With The Specific Instructions
Provided By I.C. § 19-5304(13)

Even if this Court decides not to credit the payment made to the victim by the defendant’s
own liability insurer as a payment made by the defendant, but instead treats such payments as
payment from a “third party” – i.e., a “victim” under the statute, then the provisions of the
restitution statute still require that the award to Mr. Knight be reduced by the $100,000 insurance
payment made to him by Farm Bureau. The statute instructs that:
If there is more than one (1) victim, the restitution order shall provide that the
directly injured victim(s) be fully compensated for so much of the loss caused
by the defendant’s criminal conduct which has not been paid by a third party,
including persons referred to in subsection (1)(e)(ii), (iii) and (iv) of this
section.
I.C. § 19-5304(13). The “persons” referred to in subsection (1)(e)(iv) of the section include
insurance companies who make payment to injured victims pursuant to an insurance contract,
and defines such persons as “victims.”
Under I.C. § 19-5304(3), the district court was limited to ordering restitution in the
amount necessary to fully compensate Mr. Knight “for so much of the loss not paid by a third
party.” In view of this limitation, the district court was required limit restitution for economic
loss, to the amount of loss “which has not been paid by a third party…” I.C. § 19-5304(13). The
district court failed to act within the limitations of the statute, representing a clear abuse of its
discretion.
2.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Give Effect To The
Parties’ Settlement Agreement And The Terms Of The Release

Additionally, Mr. Johnson argues that the district court abused its discretion by refusing
to give effect to the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement, including the Release signed by
Mr. Knight in consideration of the $100,000 payment. (R., p.127.) This issue was not raised by
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Mr. Johnson below, but it was addressed in the district court’s order, and the district court
decided that “the settlement, Release, and prior insurance payments do not limit the Court’s
ability to award restitution equal to the full amount of Knight’s economic loss.” (R., p.142.)
Because the issue was decided by the district court, the issue is properly raised on appeal. See
State v. Duvalt, 131 Idaho 550, 554 (1998).
Under the terms of the agreement, Mr. Knight discharged Mr. Johnson of all liability for
all claims, damages, and expenses arising from the injuries caused by Mr. Johnson. (R., pp.127,
137.) Mr. Knight also agreed to hold Mr. Johnson harmless, and to indemnify him from and
against subrogation claims, medical liens, and “any demands of any kind which have been or
may be asserted against” Mr. Johnson. (R., p.127.) (Emphasis added.) Mr. Knight signed this
agreement, entitled Release of All Claims, on March 20, 2018, a week after he had filed his
motion for restitution in this criminal case. (R., pp.63, 127.)
Mr. Johnson asserts that the settlement agreement was binding and precluded Mr. Knight
from petitioning the district court for a restitution order awarding him for his settled losses.
While the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that a civil settlement does not bar a restitution order,
see State v. Hamilton, 129 Idaho 938, 943 (Ct. App. 1997), the Idaho Supreme Court has never
addressed the issue. Mr. Johnson submits that the better rule, and the one the Supreme Court
should adopt, is to require trial courts to give effect to the terms of valid, binding agreements
when considering whether to order restitution. That is the position taken by the Minnesota Court
of Appeals in State v. Arends, the 786 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), and State v.
Ramsey, 789 N.W. 2d 513 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
In Arends, the Court held that the complete settlement of all claims in a civil action
between a defendant and a victim of economic loss precluded the State from seeking restitution
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on behalf of the victim in a related criminal case. 786 N.W.2d at 889. In Arends, the defendant
had filed counterclaims against the victim in the civil action, and the parties agreed to release all
claims and take nothing. Id.
In Ramsay, the defendant and victim had reached a civil settlement whereby the victim
agreed to restitution in the amount of $20,000, but the court in the related criminal case ordered
restitution far in excess of that amount. 789 N.W.2d at 517. The Court on appeal held that “the
terms of a binding civil settlement agreement between a defendant and the victim of the
defendant’s criminal conduct must be considered when determining restitution in the criminal
matter, particularly when the bulk of the restitution sought arises from that civil suit.” Id. at 515
(emphasis added). The Court further held that “although the state was not a party to the civil
settlement, that agreement does bind the victim.” Id. (emphasis added.) The Court cited the
universal principal that a valid settlement agreement is final, conclusive, and binding on the
parties. Id.
Mr. Johnson asserts that the Court of Appeals prior precedent is outdated and manifestly
wrong and should be overruled by that Court.10 Should his case be retained by the Idaho
Supreme Court, Mr. Johnson urges the Supreme Court to adopt the rule of the Minnesota court,
and to hold that the district court in this case abused its discretion by failing to consider the terms
of the civil settlement, and to vacate the order of restitution.

10

“Stare decisis requires that this Court follows controlling precedent unless that precedent is
manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or overruling that precedent is
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” State v.
Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4 (2015).
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3.

There Was No Economic Loss Actually Suffered By This Victim As No “Out-OfPocket” Expenses Were Shown In This Case

The district court’s award is also erroneous because the court failed to comply with the
statute’s requirement that restitution be ordered for economic loss the victim “actually suffers”
and Mr. Knight’s medical bills – the only evidence of his claimed loss – were losses sustained by
other parties, but clearly not losses suffered by Mr. Knight.
Preliminarily, it should be noted that the district court was incorrect when it stated there
was “no dispute that Knight had incurred these economic damages.” (R., p.141.) Contrary to the
district court’s understanding, at no point in these proceedings did Mr. Johnson agree that
Mr. Knight had actually suffered an economic loss in the amount shown by his medical bills.
(See generally R.; Tr., p.16, L.1 – p.28, L.13.) In his post-hearing briefing, in response to the
court’s request concerning whether the medical bills were objectionable, Mr. Johnson stated he
found no basis for challenging “the legitimacy of the additional medical bills” and he
acknowledged “a claim of $101,665.64 dollars out-of-pocket loss” but he did not concede that
the claim was valid. (R., p.123.) (Emphasis added.)

Whether the evidence established

Mr. Knight “actually suffered” an economic loss in that amount, however, remained a central
and disputed issue in these proceedings.
The district court has authority to order restitution only for economic loss that a victim
“actually suffers.” See I.C. § 19-5304(2) (“Restitution shall be ordered for any economic loss
which the victim actually suffers.”) (emphasis added); see also In re Doe, 146 Idaho 287, 283
(Ct. App. 2008) (“Restitution may be ordered only for actual economic loss suffered by a
victim.”)
“Economic loss” is defined by the statute as including, but not limited to:
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the value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, lost wages,
and direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting
from the criminal conduct, but does not include less tangible damage such as pain
and suffering, wrongful death or emotional distress.
I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a). See also State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 889 (2013).
In Straub, the Supreme Court held that, as used in the statute, the term “actually” means
“existing in fact or reality” and in contrast with the words “potential and possible.” 153 Idaho at
889, and defined the phrase “out-of-pocket” as “consisting of or requiring an actual cash outlay.”
Id. at 280.
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that Mr. Knight actually suffered no
economic loss. At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Knight revealed he had in fact paid none of his
medical bills, notwithstanding receipt of a $100,000 settlement payment (Tr., p.26, Ls.12-15,
p.21, L.20 – p.23, L.25); that due to his incarceration, all of the medical bills had gone into
collection and none of his medical care providers had filed liens. (Tr., p.23, L.25 – p.24, L.7,
p.26, Ls.12-15.) Mr. Knight also told the district court that, in his view, even if his medical
providers filed liens, the settlement proceeds would not be used to pay them. (Tr., p.26, Ls.1215.) In short, counsel represented that Mr. Knight had not paid, and did not intend to pay, any of
his medical bills. Given this record, and the representations made to the district court, the billing
statements are insufficient to support a finding of any economic loss “actually suffered” by
Mr. Knight. The district court’s restitution order therefore should be vacated.

25

CONCLUSION
Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that the order for restitution be vacated. Should this
court determine that the district court had the authority to order restitution, and that the evidence
shows Mr. Knight actually suffered an economic loss, Mr. Johnson asks that the case be
remanded to the district court for a re-determination of the amount of restitution be awarded to
Mr. Johnson.
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